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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOEY L. SILVA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050738-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for aggravated assault, a third degree felony. 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Has defendant shown that any of his counsel's alleged deficiencies 
prejudiced him, where most of the evidence he challenges was 
admissible and where the evidence of defendant's guilt presented at 
trial was overwhelming? 
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the first time on appeal are 
reviewed as questions of law. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6, 89 P.3d 162. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions and rules are attached at Addendum A: 
U.S. Const. Amend. VI; 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 12; 
Utah R.Evid. 404. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 11, 2005, defendant was charged with one count of aggravated assault, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004) (R. 1-2). 
After a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over as charged (R. 18). A jury then 
convicted him as charged (R. 84). Defendant was sentenced to zero to five years in 
prison, to be served concurrently with any other sentence he was then serving (R. 99-
100). Defendant timely appealed (R. 103-106). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The crime. On April 8, 2005, defendant ordered his friend Thayne Ward to fight 
Jack Stulce, with whom defendant had a disagreement (R. 124:81, 124, 128, 138,152, 
154, 173, 187). When Thayne began losing the fight, defendant repeatedly hit Jack with a 
miniature baseball bat (R. 124:83, 95, 131-32, 155). Jack suffered a fractured arm and a 
swollen leg (R. 124:188, 192). 
On April 8, 2005, defendant was at friend's apartment in Clearfield, Utah, with 
three other friends, Tara Rumsey, Sarah Green, and Thayne Ward (R. 124:123, 151, 168). 
A short while later, another friend arrived and told Sarah that Jack Stulce was at an 
acquaintance's house speaking badly of defendant (R. 124:124, 138, 151-52,169). 
Defendant, Tara, Sarah, and Thayne soon left the apartment in defendant's truck to find 
Jack(R. 124:124-25, 151-52, 169). 
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Shortly thereafter, the foursome arrived at Christina McKinney's home (R. 124:78, 
126, 152, 170). Sarah and defendant then descended some outside stairs to Christina's 
door and knocked, while Tara and Thayne waited at the top of the stairs (R. 124:79-80, 
126, 152-53, 171-72). When Christina opened the door, defendant told her that he wanted 
to speak with Jack (R. 124:80, 92, 127). Eventually, Jack, Christina, and Denny Bassett 
exited Christina's home and met defendant and his friends on the grass in front of the 
house (R. 124:80, 127, 153, 183, 185). 
Defendant and Jack started arguing over Sarah (R. 124:80, 128, 153, 172, 186). 
When Jack asked "why would you want to cause a fight over this whore, she's starting 
shit between us," defendant "looked at Thayne" and told him to "kick [Jack's] ass" (R. 
124:81,94, 128, 154, 173, 187, 194). Thayne and Jack then began to fight (R. 124:81, 
94, 129, 154, 173, 187). 
When Christina tried to break up the fight, defendant "ran after her to scare her 
off (R. 124:129). Defendant then ran to his truck, pulled out a miniature bat from the 
back floor, and returned to the fight (R. 124:83, 95, 129-31, 140, 155-57, 189). 
When Jack appeared "like he had the upper hand," defendant "swung [the bat] at 
Jack and hit him" several times (R. 124:83,95-98, 131-32, 155-56, 175-76, 189). This 
prompted Denny to run toward defendant "and tackled him like a football player" (R. 
124:98, 132, 155). 
Almost immediately thereafter, defendant, Sarah, Tara, and Thayne jumped back 
into defendant's truck and started to leave (R. 124:133, 158, 176). But as defendant 
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began to drive off, police stopped him (R. 124:134, 159, 177). The police ordered 
defendant and his friends to follow them back to Christina's home (R. 124:134-35, 159, 
177). 
When they arrived, a police officer asked defendant what had happened (R. 
124:135). In front of Sarah, Tara, and Thayne, defendant gave a story to police (R. 
124:136-37, 159-60). Later that evening, Sarah, Tara, and Thayne gave police the same 
story that defendant had given (R. 124:136-37, 177-78). At trial, however, all three 
admitted that their original statements to the police were false (R. 124:122, 135-41, 151, 
163). 
At defendant's trial, Denny testified that he saw defendant hit Jack with the bat (R. 
124:95-97). Christina testified that she ran into her house when she saw defendant 
heading for his truck (R. 124:83). Jack testified that defendant was the only person he 
saw with a bat that night and that "I thought maybe he hit me with it because my arm was 
all messed up but I can't really say I'm 100 percent sure that he did hit me with it" (R. 
124:189-91). 
Sarah also testified that she saw defendant hit Jack with the bat (R. 124:130-32). 
So, too, did defendant's friend, Tara (R. 124:155, 157-58). Although Thayne did not see 
defendant hit Jack with the bat, he testified that while he was fighting Jack, Jack started 
biting his finger (R. 124:174). Suddenly, Thayne "hear[d] this thug, thunck and [Jack] let 
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go of my finger" (R. 124:174). "[I]t didn't sound good" (R. 124:175). Thayne later saw 
defendant placing a bat back into his truck (R. 124:174-76). 
Defense counsel's performance at trial. During jury voir dire, the prosecutor 
listed the witnesses he intended to call at defendant's trial (R. 124:20, 31). The 
prosecutor identified one of those witnesses as Jack Kelly, "with the Davis County Jail" 
(R. 124:20, 31). 
Before trial and outside the jury's presence, defense counsel raised two issues with 
the trial court. First, 
[W]e've gone to fairly significant lengths to insure [defendant] is 
presentable and that the jury is unaware that he is at the jail or incarcerated 
at this time. [The prosecutor] had indicated when he stated who his 
witnesses are . . . that one of his witnesses was someone that worked at the 
Davis County Jail. I think when he's called, if he's called, it ought to be in 
context that he's a Davis County Deputy Sheriff and not a jailer and I think 
we can work through the semantics at that point in time if he needs to be 
called at all. 
The trial court stated, "I'd agree with that" and advised the prosecutor that, absent any 
new developments, "[p]lease be sure at this point to instruct [your witnesses]... not to 
say anything about incarceration" (R. 124:44-46).1 
The second issue defense counsel raised concerned the State's possible use of 
recorded police interviews in which several witnesses made "very inflammatory 
statements against my client" while explaining why they had lied in their prior police 
statements (R. 124:47-48). Counsel explained that, "if what they're really alleging is 
*In the end, the State did not call John Kelly as a witness. 
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witness tampering and that's what they're going to use as their basis to show these people 
are changing their story, then file the charges and go with witness tampering" (R. 124:48). 
Otherwise, "[l]et the jury hear that they've changed their story a couple of times"; 
however, "you start getting into this other stuff about 'afraid for my life' and what not, 
unless they can link directly from my client to them on that particular testimony, I just 
don't think they can tee it up that way because then they're using the witness tampering to 
convict him of the assault" (R. 124:53-54). 
When the prosecutor stated that he only intended to use the recordings if the 
witnesses lied on the stand, defense counsel reiterated, "I think [the prosecutor] can cure 
it through questioning rather than popping these videos o n . . . . I mean, show the jury that 
an inconsistent statement was made but leave the witness tampering portion out of it" (R. 
124:54). The trial court agreed, instructing the prosecutor "to try that first" (R. 124:54). 
Christina McKinney was the first witness to testify for the State. On re-direct 
examination, the prosecutor asked McKinney whether she had spoken with defendant 
since the incident (R. 124:85). Defense counsel objected as "beyond the scope of cross" 
(R. 124:85). After an unrecorded side-bar, the trial court allowed the State to reopen its 
direct and question McKinney on the issue (R. 124:85-86). McKinney testified that she 
spoke with defendant twice after the assault (R. 124:86). During the conversations, 
defendant asked her if she "was going to court and[5] at that time," she told him she 
"wasn't going to go" (R. 124:86). The two then "talked about what had happened that 
night," and, when McKinney asked defendant "how he could come to my house and 
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disrespect me like that," defendant told her "it was because he was under the influence of 
alcohol" (R. 124:87). On cross-examination, McKinney testified that defendant never 
actually called her home, but, rather, called a friend's home "and then [she] ended up on 
the phone with him" (R. 124:87). On re-direct, the prosecutor asked McKinney whether 
defendant "talk[ed] to you specifically about your testimony" (R. 124:88). Defense 
counsel immediately objected as "beyond the scope of my cross examination" (R. 
124:88). The trial court sustained defense counsel's objection (R. 124:88). 
Denny Bassett was the second witness called by the State. Bassett appeared in 
court in shackles "[bjecause I wasn't going to appear in court" (R. 124:89). After 
describing what happened on the night of the incident, Bassett acknowledged that he had 
"talked to the defendant since that night" (R. 124:101). Bassett explained that he and 
defendant had a mutual friend, Melanie, "[a]nd I'd be over at her house and people would 
come over to accept calls from him and he'd ask them, you know, if like I would not go 
or if I was going to court or what was I going to say" (R. 124:101). When Bassett then 
testified that he did not recognize defendant's voice on the telephone, defense counsel 
objected to Bassett's testimony as lacking foundation (R. 124:101-02). The prosecutor 
then asked Bassett to explain how he knew he was speaking with defendant: 
A, I heard the answer machine say, "Collect call from Boston, or Joey Silva" 
or it would say "Boston Paul" whatever but it says that out loud like it's a 
machine so . . . 
Pros: And what did he say on the phone? 
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A. On the phone? We'd screen the calls like that 'cause there's a couple of 
people that would call from the county jail. When they'd pick up when I'd 
start talking. 
Pros: When you got on the phone what did he say? 
A, He was like "What's up, f-cker?" And I'm like, nothing. I don't really 
remember much of the rest of the conversation besides he was like what's 
going on like a lame day and he was like he said he talked to his attorney 
and if I didn't go that he'd be set free. 
Defco: Objection, non-responsive. 
Pros: I specifically asked him — 
Court: I'll overrule the objection. You may continue[]. 
Pros: If you didn't go where? 
A. To court he'd just be set free because they needed to subpoena me for me to 
be able to go to court. 
Pros: Did he talk to you about getting a subpoena? 
A. Yeah, he asked if I had gotten a subpoena and I'd say, no, that I hadn't been 
around my house or you know. 
Pros: What did he say about that? 
A. That they needed to subpoena me and if they didn't subpoena me, I'd be 
alright. 
Pros: . . . Did you tell him what you were going to do until that time? 
A. I just said don't worry about it, I'm not going to court, that I wasn't going to 
do nothing. I wasn't going to like—like if they subpoenaed me then I 
would but I wasn't going to sit there and just show up. 
(R. 124:102-03). 
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Outside the jury's presence, defense counsel made a record of the objection he had 
originally raised during Christina McKinney's testimony: 
Defco: My objection was to any reference to post event phone calls 
between—at the time I made it it was with Christina McKinney and my 
client. I objected that any statements would be too prejudicial, outweigh the 
probative value and the Court overruled me on that. I just wanted to make a 
record that the objection had been made and overruled. 
Court: [Prosecutor?]. 
Pros: And Your Honor, we asked the question of—we were going down that line 
of questioning with regard to Christina, however, it did not come in, at least 
the prejudicial parts and I don't see—we did ask the question with regard to 
phone calls to Denny [Bassett] and I believe that there was probative value 
because it goes to the defendant's intent, his motive and also as the jury 
could see, we had Denny brought in in shackles and the State had some 
concern about him showing up. He admitted to having discussions with the 
defendant about not showing up so I believe that that was very probative 
and the jury needed to hear it in [sic] outweighs any prejudicial effects. 
Court: I'll create this for the record, my distinct memory of the objection 
was only to statements by the witness that the defendant told them not to 
appear at trial or persuaded them from appearing at trial or testifying. So 
with regard to that specific objection that I determined based on State's 
presentation that this went to the state of mind of the defendant, to his 
intent, that while there was some prejudicial effect, there was also some 
probative value, again, state of mind and the prejudice didn't substantially 
outweigh the probative value. As a practical matter, the items objected to 
by defense counsel were never elicited in direct testimony from the State. 
(R. 124:111-12). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 
object to prior bad acts evidence. Specifically, defendant claims his counsel was 
ineffective for not objecting to testimony from Denny Bassett that defendant contacted 
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him before trial to see if he was going to testify, and in not objecting to testimony from 
the same witness suggesting that defendant was incarcerated at the time defendant 
contacted him. Defendant's claim fails for lack of prejudice. 
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show both that his 
counsel performed deficiently and that he was prejudiced by counsel's performance. This 
Court need not consider whether counsel performed deficiently, however, if defendant 
cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel's performance. Here, this Court need not 
determine whether defendant's counsel performed deficiently because defendant cannot 
show that he was prejudiced by counsel's performance. First, evidence that defendant 
attempted to dissuade Denny Bassett from testifying at his trial was admissible to show 
defendant's consciousness of guilt. Thus, any objection to it would have been futile. 
Second, even if improper, Bassett's brief references to defendant's incarceration were 
harmless given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT ANY OF HIS COUNSEL'S 
ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES PREJUDICED HIM, WHERE MOST 
OF THE EVIDENCE HE CHALLENGES WAS ADMISSIBLE AND 
WHERE THE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S GUILT AT TRIAL 
WAS OVERWHELMING 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel denied him his "right to the effective 
assistance of counsel by failing to object to evidence of [defendant's] other crimes, 
wrongs or acts." Aplt. Br. at 6 (capitalization and holding omitted). Specifically, 
defendant claims his counsel's "failure to object to the State's presentation of evidence of 
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[defendant's] incarceration or alleged witness tampering fell below an objective standard 
of reasonable professional judgment." Id. at 12. Defendant contends that he was 
prejudiced by counsel's performance because "[t]he manner in which the evidence . . . 
w[as] presented at trial increased the likelihood that the jury would and did convict [him] 
based on his criminal character or propensity to commit bad acts." Id. at 14. Defendant's 
claim lacks merit. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must demonstrate both 
that "counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgement," and that "counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial — i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 
76, Tf 19, 12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)); see 
also State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). 
To prevail on the first prong of this test, "'[defendant must identify specific acts 
or omissions demonstrating that counsel's representation failed to meet an objective 
standard of reasonableness.'" Moench v. State, 2004 UT App 57, ^ 21, 88 P.3d 353 
(quoting Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995)) (additional citations and 
quotation marks omitted). In doing so, defendant must "rebut the strong presumption that 
under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
To prevail on the second prong, defendant must show that absent counsel's 
deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable result. See 
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Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50. Such a showing must be based on a "demonstrable reality and 
not a speculative matter." Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also State v. 
Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996) ("[An] invitation to speculate cannot substitute 
for proof of prejudice."). Thus, defendant "must affirmatively show that there is a 
'reasonable probability' that, but for counsel's errors, the result would have been 
different." State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 954 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted), 
aff'd, 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995). 
Finally, "it is not necessary for [this Court] 'to address both components of the 
inquiry if [defendant] makes an insufficient showing on one.'" Parsons v. Barnes, 871 
P.2d 516, 523 (Utah 1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697); see also State v. Wright, 
2004 UT App 102, \ 9, 90 P.3d 644. Thus, "[w]hen it is 'easier to dispose of an 
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,'" this Court "will do 
so without addressing whether counsel's performance was professionally reasonable." 
Parsons, 871 P.2d at 523 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697); see also Wright, 2004 UT 
App 102, f 9. 
In this case, this Court can readily dispose of defendant's ineffectiveness claim "on 
the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice." Parsons, 871 P.2d at 523. Thus, this Court 
need not consider "whether counsel's performance was professionally reasonable." Id.2 
2In making this argument, the State does noo concede that counsel performed 
deficiently. 
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First, although defendant contends that evidence of his contact with witnesses 
before trial was inadmissible under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence,3 defendant cites 
no case law supporting his contention. See Aplt. Br. at 12-13. Nor can he. 
Courts have uniformly held that rule 404(b) does not exclude evidence of a 
defendant's improper attempts to influence a witness's testimony, because such evidence 
is highly relevant to the noncharacter purpose of "consciousness of guilt." See, e.g., 
United States v. Henderson, 58 F.3d 1145, 1150 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that evidence of 
defendant's attempts to influence prosecution witness evinced guilty conscience for 
underlying crimes); United States v. Gonsalves, 668 F.2d 73, 74-76 (1st Cir. 1983) 
(holding that defendant's threat against adverse witness was relevant to show 
consciousness of guilt); Morris v. State, 731 S.W.2d 230, 231-32 (Ark. App. 1987) 
(holding that persuasion of witness to change testimony was relevant to show 
consciousness of guilt); State v. Baker, 773 P.2d 1194, 1199 (Mont. 1989) (holding that 
defendant's suggestion to prosecution witness that he might "accidentally somehow" get 
3Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.... 
Evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose 
and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403. See State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, f 16, 
108 P.3d 730; Commentary to Utah R. Evid. 404. Rule 402 makes all relevant evidence 
admissible except as otherwise provided in the rules. Rule 403 excludes relevant 
evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice." 
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amnesia and his offer to send money if proven innocent were admissible to show 
consciousness of guilt); Garza v. State, 358 S.W.2d 622, 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962) 
(holding that efforts by defendant to induce witness to testify falsely admissible as 
indicating consciousness of guilt). 
Defendant, therefore, cannot show that a rule 404(b) objection to the "alleged 
witness tampering" evidence would have been anything other than futile. Consequently, 
defendant cannot show that his counsel performed deficiently in not raising the objection, 
let alone that he was prejudiced by counsel's performance. See State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 
41, Tf 26, 1 P.3d 546 ("Failure to raise futile objections does not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel."); see also State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, ^ 34, 989 P.2d 52 (same). 
Given the admissibility of the "alleged witness tampering evidence," the only 
remaining evidence supporting defendant's ineffectiveness claim are Denny's vague 
references to defendant's being incarcerated when they spoke on the telephone. See R. 
124:102-04 (Denny explaining that his friend screened her calls because "there's a couple 
of people that would call from the county jail"; Denny testifying that defendant "said he 
talked to his attorney and if I didn't go [to court] that he'd be set free"). 
However, in determining whether an error is harmful, a court considers a number 
of factors, including "the overall strength of the State's case." State v. Hamilton, 827 
P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992). "The more evidence, the less likely there was harmful error." 
Id 
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Here, defendant's brief contains no recitation of the substantial evidence presented 
at trial that supported defendant's conviction. Compare Aplt. Br. at 3-15 with Statement 
of Facts, supra at pp. 2-4. Absent that recitation, defendant cannot show how three 
ambiguous references to defendant's incarceration by one witness were prejudicial. See 
Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50 (holding that claim of prejudice must be based on a 
"demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter") (citation and quotation marks 
omitted); see also Arguelles, 921 P.2d at 441. In any event, as explained in the Statement 
of Facts above, see supra pp. 2-5, several eyewitnesses, including defendant's friends, 
testified that the saw defendant hit Jack Stulce with the bat. 
In sum, defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by counsel's performance, 
even if it were deficient. Consequently, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED _UL My 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KARENA.KLUCZMK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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U.S. Const. Amend. VI 
Amendment VI. Jury trial for crimes and procedural rights 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the: crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence: 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the' nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in 
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause 
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of- the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Utah R. Evid, 404 
a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of Accused Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of 
the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted under Rule 
404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the prosecution; 
(2) Character of Alleged Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 
alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, 
or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in 
Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case 
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to 
introduce at trial. 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; February 11, 1998; November 1, 200L] 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Rule 404 is now Federal Rule of Evidence 404 verbatim. The 2001 amendments add the 
notice provisions already in the federal rule, add the amendments made to the federal rule 
effective December 1, 2000, and delete language added to the Utah Rule 404(b) in 1998. 
However, the deletion of that language is not intended to reinstate the holding of State v. 
Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). Evidence sought to be admitted under Rule 404(b) 
must also conform with Rules 402 and 403 to be admissible. 
